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Abstract
This paper examines the closed economy effects of government policies that
vary with respect to whether they treat newly produced capital differently from
old capital. Policies that do make this distinction are denoted investment
policies, while those that do not are labelled savings policies. While both
types of policies alter marginal incentives to accumulate new capital, investment
incentives can generate significant inframarginal redistribution from current
holders of wealth to those with small or zero claims on the existing capital
stock. Among the principal findings, based on simulations of a general equili-
brium, perfect foresight, overlapping generations life—cycle model, are:
1)Investment incentives, even if financed by short run increases in
the stock of debt, significantly increase capital formation.
2)Deficit—financed savings incentives, in contrast, typically reduce
the economy's long run capital stock.
3) Deficit—financed investment incentives can actually be self—financing,
in that they may lead to a long run surplus without any increase in
other tax rates.
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in closed economies, saving and investment represent, respectively, the
supply of and demand for new domestic capital. Saving incentives shift the
supply curve for new domestic capital, while investment incentives shift the
demand curve. The basic public finance equivalence theorem that the real
effects of a tax (subsidy) are independent of who noxinally pays the tax
(receives the subsi) applies equally well to the market for new capital.
Hence, in closed economies, saving and investment incentives do not repre-
sent conceptually distinct policies, and the real effects of taxes or sub-
sidies applied to the supply of new capital, saving, can be replicated by
taxes or subsidies applied to the demand for n capital, investment.
While economically meaningful distinctions between saving and invest-
ment incentives do not arise, there are meaningful distinctions between
policies that affect savings, the sum of past and current saving, and those
that directly affect only current saving, or, in equilibrium, current
investment.
This paper examines the closed econorrr effects of government policies
that vary with respect to whether they treat newly produced capital dif-
ferentlyfrom oldcapital. Policies that distin&iish new capital from old
aredenoted investment policies, while those thatdonot are labelled
savings policies. While both types ofpolicies alter marginal incen-
tives to accumulate new capital, investment incentiv can generate
significant infraxnarnal redistribution from current holders of wealth
to those with small or zero claims on the existing stock of capital. In
the context of a neoclassical growth model, this redistribution runs, in
large part, from the elderly to young and future generations. The
direction of this intergenerational transfer is opposite to that—2—
associatedwith the "burden of governnrnt debt"; in the case of debt, the
governrrnt passes the tax bill for current expenditures on to future genera-
tions.
Intergenerational transfers can have important effects on national saving
and capital formation in the life grth cycle rrxdel that posits zero or limited
intergenerational altruism. The process by which these transfers affect capital
formation is often referred to as "crowding out" of investment. A natural
question to pose in a life cycle model is whether the ttcrcMding in" of new capi-
tal formation arising from investment incentives exceeds the crding out pro-
duced by deficits potentially associated with these incentives. This question
has particular relevance to present economic affairs since current U.S. pro-
jected deficits reflect, in large part, business tax cuts.
In addition to analyzing the net impact on capital formation of deficit—
financed business tax cuts, this paper considers the potential for self—
financing business tax cuts. A self—f inancin6 business tax cut is defined here
as a deficit—financed investment incentive that produces an increase in the
econonry'slong runtax base sufficient to permit the government to reach long
runbudget balance without ever raising tax rates.
Athirdissue of considerable relevance to current economic policy is
whethergradual increases in investznt incentives delay investirient until the
incentives have been fully phased in. The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA)
provided for even greater investment incentives after 1984 than between 1981 and
1984. The 1982 Economic Report of the President indicated a potential decline
in the effective tax rate on equity financed new investment in general
industrial equipment from 21 percent in 1982 to negative 514percentin 1986.
In part, these figures reflect steadily declining projected inflation rates
interacting with historic cost depreciation provisions. In addition, ERTA—3—
authorized more favorable depreciation schedules starting in 195. While the
1982 tax act reduced future increases in the acceleration of depreciation, the
1981 act may,inpart, be responsible for the historically l investment rate
in 1982.
The principal findings of this paper with respect to these three issues
are:
(1) Investment incentives, even those financed by short runincreases
in the stock of debt, significantly increase capital formation in
life cycle economies.
(2) Deficit—financed savings incentives, in contrast, typically reduce
the economy's rate of capital formation in the long run.
(3) Deficit—financed investment incentives can be self—financing for
particular, but not unreasonable, parameterizations of neoclassi-
cal life—cycle growth models.
()Gradualphasing in of investment incentives can actually reduce
rather than stiimlate short term investment.
(5) The underlying explanation for the relative efficacy of investment
as oppOsed to savings incentives in stirailating capital formation
in life cycle ide1s is that investnnt incentives redistribute
from the old to the young. Since the old in life cycle models
have higher marginal propensities to consume out of lifetime
resources than the young, this transfer reduces current consump-
tion, permitting the "crowding in" of current investxnt.
The analysis of investment incentives is based on the Auerbach—Kotlikoff
(1983) life cycle computer siraijation model. The del describes the per-
fect foresight growth path of life cycle economies in response to a wide
variety of fiscal policies. Forpurposes ofthis study the model has been—11—
expanded to include full or partial expensing of new capital as a policy
option. Expensing is only one of several types of currently legislated invest—
inent incentives; its use is liniited to a small subset of total U.S. investment.
Ffowever, expensing is a convenient devise for analyzing a variety of other
investment incentives including the investment tax credit and the acceleration
of depreciation; rates of fractional expensing can be chosen that produce effec-
tive tax rates on new investment equal to those arising from these other poli-
cies. In addition, if deficit policy is chosen appropriately, expensing poli-
cies can produce a time path of cash flows to the government similar to those
that would arise from changes in the ITC or depreciation schedules.
The second substantitive addition to the model is the inclusion of cost of
quickly adjusting the econonv's capital stock. As described b many authors
(including Abel, 1979; Hayashi, 1981; and Summers, 1981), such increasing margi-
nal costs of investment generate inframarginal rents to existing capital. As a
consequence, the market valuation of the econol:v's existing capital stock can
differ from its replacement cost. The assumption of quadratic ad,ustment costs
leads to a theory of' investment in which the rate of investment is a linear
function of' Tobin's q (Tobin, 1969) ,the ratio of the stock market value of capi-
tal to its replacement cost. Tobin's q is also an important variable in deter-
mining household consumption and labor supply decisions. These decisions are
based on the current and future wages and rates of return households foresee,
but also on the householdTs initial wealth, including the market value of its
claims to existing capital.
Since the elderly are the primary owners of capital in a life cycle model,
consideration of adjustment costs, with their associated implications for
changes in the wealth of the elderly, can be quite iortant in assessing the
redistributive impact of numerous fiscal policies. One example is a switch from—5—
anincome to an equal revenue consumption tax.Such a policy suggests a signi-
ficant loss in welfare to the elderly, whose wealth holdings must now be spent,
in part, to meet taxes on the purchase of consumption goods. With capital
adjustmentcosts, however, there is a countervailing effect serving to increase
the wealth and welfare of the elderly. The stimulus to capital fornation asso-
ciated with the consumption tax produces an irnnrdiate increase in stock mrket
values, reflecting increased inframarginal rents to the existing capital stock.
The higher initial stock market values obviously redound to the advantage of the
elderly.
In addition to mitigating the intergenerational redistribution from the old
tothe young in the case of a switch to a consumption tax, the inclusion of
adjustment costs in the rdel cushions the fall in stock market values asso-
ciated withinvestment incentives that discriminate ainst old capital.
Permitting expensing of new capital at higher rates than were previously allowed
and restricting this expensing solely to new capital is an exarle of a policy
injurious to the elderly, since it places existing capital at a financial disad-
vantage relative to new capital. But the welfare loss to the elderly is miti-
gated to the extent that the econonv's desire for an ultimately greater level of
capital per orker raises infranarginal rents on previously installed, i.e.
existing, capital.
The next section of this paper igores the issue of adjustment costs
in order to clarify, in a simple framework, differences between investment and
savings incentives. The discussion points out equivalence relationships between
investnt incentives and other fiscal policies. In particular,permitting 100
percentexpensing of new capital in the presence of a capital income tax (levied
either on individuals or on businesses, in the form of a profits tax) is equiva-
lent to imposing a one tine wealth tax at a rate equal to that of the capital—6—
income tax. If the econon- also taxes labor income at this same rate, intro-
ducing 100 percent expensing taxes wagesandinitial wealth at the same rate.
This tax structure, in turn, is equivalent to a proportional consumption tax.
With the exception of the investment tax credit, new U.S. business invest—
inent incentives are available to old as well as new capital; the old capital
must, however, be sold to qualify for the newincentives.The sale of old capi-
tal requires payment of recapture taxes calculated on the difference between the
asset's new sale price and its adjusted basis. If the taxes incurred in turning
over old assets exceed the present value gain in investment incentives from such
a transaction, turnover will not be stimulated; in this case the econoxciic out-
come of new investment provisions that do not explicitly exclude old capital
will be identical to that which would have occurred had the new incentives been
restrictedsolely to new capital.
Section III considers the
1981TaxAct; for much of U.S.
foyer exceed the benefits. For
absence of transaction costsis
potential for turning over old capital under the
capitalproduced prior to 19l thecosts of tur—
the reining assets, however, turnover, in the
profitable,but turnover taxes still recapture
most of the gains fromthese transactions. Hence, with respect to recent tax
legislation, the effective,ifnot the nominal, tax treatment of new and old
capital is quite different, and the ne law pririly provides investment as
opposedtosavingsincentives.
Section IVdescribes the version of theAuerbach—Kotlikoff simulation
model used to compare savings and investment incentives in both the presence and
absence of capital adjustment costs. The fo11owin section presents simulations
ofthesepolicies and examines the extent ofshort—runand long—run crowding
out.—T—
Section VI considers three alternatives to the deficit—financing of
investment incentives. One involves a delay in the introduction of
expensing. A second involves actually increasing the tax on capital income
in conjunction with full expensing, while a third involves a reduction in
theextent to which expensing is permitted.
The first simulation shows that a time path of increasingly generous
investment incentives can be associated with simultaneous declines in stock
marketvalues, quite low and, possibly, negative short term interest rates and
fairly large, positive long term interest rates. Such a policy actually
suppresses short—run investment. The second simulation dent'nstrates the
somewhat paradoxical result that given a structure of investment incentives,
increases in capital income tax rates (e.g. ,corporateor dividend tax rates)
will generally stimulate, rather than retard, capital formation, while requiring
an immediate decline in wage taxes to avoid running surpluses. Finally, our
third simulation shows that the government, through a policy of partial
expensing, can raise investment and generate a surplus without ever raising
eithertile capital income tax or the labor income tax.
Thelast section of the paper suxmmrizes ntjor findings and relates these
results to recent economic events.II. Investment Incentives —StructuralRelationship
to Other Fiscal Policies
A simple two period life cycle model of economic growth provides a. con-
venient framework for examining the underlying nature of investment incen-
tives.Consider such an econolw with a tax on labor incoi, a tax
Tr,t
on businessprofits, andan expensing rate for newcapital of et. The
subscript t denotes the period in which the threeinstruments are applied.
To simplify the analysis further, assume individuals work onlywhen young
andthat the depreciation rate, the rate of population growth, and the rate
of technological change are zero.




(2) Coit—i K (1 +rt)
In (1), W,_i (1 —twt..i)
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is the saving of the youngin
period t—l,theirafter tax wages in period t—l less their consumption
in period in t—1. The net price of a unit of capital in period t—1 is given
by q1• Dividing the financial savin, of the young byq.tl determines
theirpurchase ofphysical capital. The physical capital acquired by the
young at the end of period t—l equals the econon's capital stock at the
beginning of period t, Kt; the old generation in period t (those youngin
t—l)holdclaims to all the econoç's capital, since the younginperiod t
have no beginning of period assets.
For the old in period t, consumption, Cot equals the return of prin-
cipal, Q3 plus the after tax return on the investment, q.l Kt rt.
The after tax return,r, includes capital gains and losses:—9—
—FKt(1 —trt)+ t —Cit_i.
-t — _
In(3) FKt (1 —Tr,t)equals marginal after tax profits per unit of capi-
tal. In combination, (2) and (3) imply:
() = ctK + Kt FKt
—trt)
This newexpressionis also intuitive: the consumption of the old in period t
(the young of period t—1) equals after tax business profits plus the value
of the sale of their capital at the prevailing asset price
Equation (5) expresses q, the net price of purchasing a unit of capi-
tal, in teris of tr
t
=1—trtet
For new capital the net acquisition cost is 1, the price of new capital,
less the tax rebate frog expensing,'r,t et. Equation (5) also determines
the price of old capital. Since old capital and new capital are perfect
substitutes in production their net acquisition costs must be identical in
equilibrium; hence, old capital sells for tr,tet less than new capital
because the purchaser of new capital receives tr,.tet from the government,
while the purchaser of old capital receives no tax rebate. Since the value
of old capital depends on the prothct of tr,tet, the price of old capital
falls not only when expensing is increased (and rr,t is positive), but also
when the rate of business profits taxation rises, given an expensing policy.
Equations (1), (Li), and (5) may now be combined to indicate the life-
time budget constraint of the young in period t—1,
(i —'t1 et l
(6) +c0(i — —r=w,_1 (1 ——10—
and the old in period t—1:
(fl C0
=Kt_i(1 —tr,t_let1) +Kt_iFK (1 —'r,t—l
These equations suffice to describe the relationship of savings and
investment incentives to other tax structures. First, consider the case of
zero expensing (e1 =e
=a).This assumption produces an econozzy with
period t capital income and wage tax rates of tr,t and respectively. In
such an econoL7, the return to new capital, capital produced in period t—land
old capital, capital produced prior to period t—l, are taxed at the same effec-
tiverates in period t and beyond. With zero expensing, there is no discrimina-
tion in favor of newly produced capital; the relative price of new and old capi-
talis always unity. Changes in the time path of IandIthatsatisfy the r,t w,
government's long run budget constraint (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1983) are
classified,in our taxonony, as savings incentives. Section V indicates that
loweringcapital income tax rates will typically depress rather than stimulate
long—termcapital formation if such savings incentives are deficit—financed.
The essential feature of investnrnt incentives can be illustrated most
simply by assumingzero wage taxation, per.nent capital income taxation at
rate ,zeroexpensing prior to period t—l, and a pernent move to 100
percent expensing starting at time t—l.Underthese assumptions, alltax
terms drop out of equation (6);theyoung of period t—l and all future
generationsface zeroeffective taxation over their lifetirrs. While the
young and futuregenerations nominally paybusinessprofits taxes intheir
old age, the reduced cost of purchasing capital when they are young exactly
offsets the present value cost of this taxation. Stated differently, new
generationsstarting in year t—l are subsidized when young to purchase—11—
capital and taxed when old on its return. The subsidy and tax cancel in
present value and the young face no net taxation on their capital invest-
ments.
While this new tax structure effectively exets the young of period
t—l and all future generations from paying any taxes over their lifetime,
elderly individuals at time t—lsuffera capital loss on their assets equal
to Kit According to (7), theconsumption of the elderly falls by this
amount; the Ki trcapital loss constitutes a one time wealth tax on the
old of period t—l. Considering the tax treatment of the young and old
together,this new tax system is equivalent to the government's collecting
(1 + FK Trintaxes from the old in period t—l and abolishing taxa—
t—l
tion thereafter.1
Thisexanle highlightsthe special featureofinvestment incentives,
namely that they tax initial holdings of wealth. A second irortantfeature
is that they lower the effective tax on the return to savi.ng of young and
future generations. With 100 percent expensing the effective capital incot
tax rate is reduced to zero.
The presence of wage taxation alters the analysis somewhat. Let us now
assumepositive and pernEnently fixed values ofand
t...Inthis case
movingto full expensing leavesyoung individuals facing a lifetime wage









Theelderly in period t—lainface an additional wealth tax of Kt_i tr
in addition to business profits taxes of Kti
FK Tr Ift equals the
t—1
caseof a. proportional incot tax, (7) becomes:
(7') C0,_1
(1 + =Kt_i(1 +
FK1)
Equations (6') and (7')denstrate that the rveaent to full expensing in
thepresence of a proportional income tax produces a consumption tax,or
eq.uivalently-, a wage tax plus a one time wealth tax on the elderly where the
wage and one time wealth tax rates are identical. This tax structure
corresponds exactly to that proposed by Hall and Rabushka (1982) in their
recent flat tax proposal. While the Hall—Rabushka proposal generates a
genuine consumption tax, other proposals such as unlimited use of IRAs and
abolition of the corporate income tax, which are billed as "providing con-
sumption tax treatment" of income flows, produce wage tax rather than con—
suraption tax structures. In the case of unlimited IRAs, the initial owners
of capital can place all their holdings of capital into IRAs, receiving tax
deductions that equal in present value the taxes on withdrawals of principal
plus interest from the IRA. Thus the owners of existing capital face no
effective taxation on the conversion of their capital into consumption
expenditures; a policy of unlimited IRAs effectivelyeliminates the capital
incometax component of the income tax with noeffective wealth tax on
existing assets. For those with no initial assets, wage taxation and con-
sumption taxation are structurally equivalent. Hence, a policy of unlimited
IRAsanda zero corporate income tax replicates a wage tax.It does not
replicatea consumption tax.
Another complication of the foregoing analysis is that the actual U.S. tax
law permits existing assets to qualify for new tax incentives, if they are sold
by the existing owner. For example, the 1981 Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(ACRS) does not explicitly exclude old capital, though application ofACRS—13—
toold capital requires a change in the capital's ownership. It is important
to distinguish here between direct capital ownership and indirectownership
through firms. One normally thinks of life cycle transfers of assets as
being accomplished by the sale of shares in finns owning capital goods.
This is not considered to be a change in the ownership of thecapital goods
themselves, which would require the sale of the actual goods by one firm to
another. Thus, we may imagine that in selling off their assets theelderly
can choose whether to transfer ownership of assets or ownership of firms,
with the only resulting difference being whether sale of thecapital goods
themselves is recognized for tax purposes. We refer to the former caseas
"turnover"of assets.
Ifoldcapital is eligible for new investoEnt incentives (expensing) sub-
jectto recapture taxation, the budget constraint facing the elderly isno





where is the recapture tax per unit capital.
Acomparison of (T)and(7'')impliesthat sale of old capital to acquire
eligibility for current investriEnt incentives available to new capital will
only occur if tr,t_l ei exceeds Ri. If these two terms are equal,
the elderly are indifferent between selling their capitalas old capital, e.g.
selling equity title to previo.isly expensed capital, or selling the actual capi-
tal atits replacement cost of unity and paying recapture taxes.
If turnover is advantageous, (7' ') indicates thatrecapture taxes are
equivalent to lumpsum taxes of equal size on the initial generation of
elderly.For theyoung in period t—l, thelifetime budget constraint is no
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For given values of FK,
r,t—l'
tandet..i. values of Rt that maketurn— r,t
over profitable imply a larger effective after tax return on the saving of the
young. In the case of a zero recapture tax, expensing implies no additional
taxation of the elderly, and an effective subsidy on capital income to the
young.III. Recapture Taxes and the Exclusion of'OldCapital
From the Accelerated Cost Recovery System
The extent to which recapture taxation inhibits turnover is an empiri-
cal question that depends on the size of changes in investment incentives.
The set of' new incentives considered here are those provided by the
Accelerated Cost ecovery Systea. Though the business tax provisions have
again been altered by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of l92,
the more recent legislation represents a small change from previous law, and
introduces no additional incentives to turn over old assets to obtain the
tax treatment accorded new assets. This is because the l9d2 Act maintains
currentdepreciat ion allowances indefinitely.
The 1981 Act introduced a sharp increase in the present value of depre-
ciation allowances relative tothose previously available. Like an increase
inthe expensing fraction restricted to newly produced capital, accelerated
depreciation can lower the value ofexistingassets. While the new ACRS
provisionsare available to owners of old assets provided they sell
(turnover) their old assets, the sale of these assets generates recapture taxes
thatmy exceed the net increase in depreciation allowances. To the extent that
such a sale is attractive, the fraction of the loss in value that the seller
recoupsrepresents a. "leakage" to old capital of the investment incentive
embodiedin CRS.
The recapture treatment of structures and equipment differs and they
must be considered separately. For structures, the seller must pay a tax on
the difference between sale price and depreciatedbasis, with the difference
between sale price and hypothetical straight—line basis taxed as a capital
gain, and the additional difference between straight—line basis and actual—16--
basis (positive if a more accelerated depreciation method has been used),
taxed as ordinary incon. Thus, the total tax due on an asset with a one
dollar sale price is:
(8) R =c(1 —BSL)
+(SL
—
wherec is the capital gains tax rate (equal to .28 for corporations) and Iis
the inco tax rate (Jt6 for corporations). The basis B and hypothetical
straight—line basis B51 depend on the age of the asset, which deteraines the
extent to which depreciation alliances have been taken, and the asset's initial
purchase price. If a t year old asset physically depreciates at a constant
exponential rate ,andthe inflation rate is it,thenits initial purchase price
t was e .Thus,letting bSL and b be the straight—line basis and actual
basis for an asset aged t per initial cost, we have from (b)
(9) Rt =c(l-b1e(4t) +I et(bL-bt)
in return for this recapture tax, the potential seller receives one dollar
times the number of units of' capital (at replacement cost) for his asset rather
than the value it would coranand with its old depreciation allowances. Since
investors imist be indifferent between old and new capital, the price of an asset
not turned over must reflect the difference in depreciation allowances afforded
new capital and those available to old capital.
(lo' =1—1(7rt (Tt)t / q
where Z0 is the present lue of reLnining depreciation allowances for an asset
of age t initially purchased for a dollar and is the present value of
allowance per dollar of new capital under A0±tS. Equation (10) corresponds to
the earlier equation (5) derived for the case of expensing. Here, the expensing—17—
fraction e is replaced by the more general expression of thedifference between
the values of prospective depreciation allowanceson new and old assets.
Using(9) and(10), we may now ask whether the turnover taxRt exceeds the
increase in sale price (i —qt)that the seller can obtain by opting forrecap-
ture. In addition, lettingZ0 be the present value of depreciation allowances
fora new asset purchased under pre—1981 law, wemy calculate what fraction of
the capital loss generated by ACRS is avoidedwhen turnover is profitable.
Sincethe price of an asset of age t would have been
t t (ó_n)t (ii) q0 =1—t (z0— e
hadthere been no change in tax regime, the capital losscaused by ACRS for
existing assets not turned over is
t (12) q —q=
T(ZACRS
—
perdollar of age t capital.
Our calculations require parameter values for ôand iT,thedepreciation
andinflation rates, and prior depreciation provisions. Forpurposes of
illustration,we set 6 =.03and r =.Ob.We assume an after tax nodnal
discountrate of .10 and that prior tax depreciaticn followed the 150per-
cent declining balance forraila with optimal straight—lineswitch—over, based
on a tax lifeline of 35 years. These estimates of both actual andtax
depreciationare meant to correspond roughly to a typical structures invest-
ment (see Jorgenson and Sullivan, 1982). We assume assetsare purchased six
monthsinto the tax year and that tax payments are madeannually,midway
through the tax year as well. Post—1981 tax depreciation follows the 175
percent declining balance fornula with optimal straight—lineswitch—over,
based on a tax lifetii of 15years, as dictated by ACES.—18—
Table 1 shows the results of calculations of qt and Rt for structures
purchasedtyears before the enactment of PLCRB. The last co1nmnshows the
fractionof the capital loss caused by ACRS (equal to 12.1 cents per dollar
of capital) that could be recouped by turnover. Though turnover would not
beuseful for structures alreac' conlete1y written off, it appears advan-
tageous for the bulkofstructures. Because of growth anddepreciation, a
large fraction of the structure's capital stock is represented by assets
purchased in recent years. For those assets, recoupment is substantial.
For structures purchased within four years of the 1981 tax change, turnover
allows a recouent of over half the capital loss caused by ACR. This
figure is 85 percent for assets only one year old. Overall, if we assume a
constant real rate of annual investment growthof3 percent, this recoupment
froLl turnover amoui-its to about one third of the capital loss on.structures,
given our parameterization. This result also suggests that, absent transac-
tion costs, a large fraction of the structures capital stock ought to have
been turned over upon the enactment of ACRb. However, such costs are clearly
substantial for certain assets, such asfactoriesand bui1din, cox1ementary
to other productive factors in a compan''s production process. However, one
would expect to see a greater turnover activity in commercial structures, such
as apartment buildings and office buildings.
We turn next to the recapture treatment of equipment. Here, the analysis
is complicated by the fact that most equipment qualifies for the investment tax
credit, but only if the asset is new. The law greatly restricts the ability of
an investor in used property to obtain the LTC. Moreover, the credit obtained
by the original purchaser is also subject to recapture if the number of years
the asset has been held is less than the miniim number of years required to
qualify for such a credit. For example, equipment purchased before 1961 neededTable 1
THE INCENTIVE TO RESELj.. ASSETS
(Str,icture)
PerDollar of Age t Capital Fraction of
Gain fror Resale Capital Loss







1 .021 .876 .103 .85
2 o46 .864 .090 .74
3 .069 .853 .on3 .64
4 .090 .843 .067 .55
5 .107 .834 .059 .49
6 .124 .825 .051 .42
7 .139 .818 .043 .36
8 .153 .811 .036 .30
9* .164 .805 .031 .26
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* Oncean asset is 100 monthsold, the fraction of (BSL —B)subject to ordi-
nary incor taxation declines by one percent per month until it reaches zero at
200 months. Thisisaccounted for in these calculations.—20—
a tax lifetime of at least seven years to qualify for the full 10 percent
credit. Assets with lifetimes of between five and seven years received only a
6—2/3 percent credit, and those with lifetimes between three and five years
received a 3—1/3 percent credit. If an asset with a lifetime exceeding seven
years were sold after, say, six years, the seller would have to repay one—third
of the original credit received; if the sale were after four years, two—thirds of
the original credit would be repaid, and so on.
A second difference in recapture treatment of equipment is that the entire
differential between sale price and basis is taxed as ordinary incon, unless
sale price exceeds initial purchase price, in which case the gain on purchase
price is taxed as a capital gain. These two differences in the recapture treat-
ment of equipment make turnover less attractive than in the case of structures.
As long as the sale price of the asset is less than original purchase
price, the total recapture tax on one dollar of equipment aged t is
(13) Et ='(P —bte(6T)t) + (k —kt)e(1)t
where bt, iT and T are defined as before, k is the investment tax credit
c1aid originally, and kt the credit that, ex post, the asset lifetinr t would
have dictated for the asset. F, less than unity, is the sale price. It
accounts for the fact that, unlike a dollar of new capital, this asset will only
receive the ACES depreciation deductions and not the investment tax credit.
Thus:2





If the asset is not sold, then the value of the t—year old capital per dollar of
replacement cost is:—21—
(15) =1—(+I Zcs—t Ze)
which differs from the equation for structures (10) only in the inclusion of the
investment tax credit.
The seller of an asset will gain from turning the asset over if—qt
exceeds Rt. However, for representative parameters for equipment, this will not
occur. Table 2 shows the values of Rt and for an asset that depreciates at a
rate of .12 and under old law was written off over a tax lifetime of ten years
using the double—declining balance rrthod with a switch—over to straight line.
The value of P is .839, and the inflation rate and discunt rates are, as above,
set at .08 and .10. As the results show, the prospective seller would always
lose by turning assets over on resale. Thus, owners of equipment can escape
none of the capital loss induced by the liberalization of depreciation allowances
over, the loss equals approxiiately 10.5 cents per dollar of existing equipnnt
and 12.1 cents per dollar of existingstmctures.With the zxiiiim gain from
turnover, about one third of the loss on structures is recou.>ed. Using estiirates
of the equipment/strctures breakdown of t1• percent and 55.6percent,respec-
tively, obtained from data for 19T5, and with an estite of 2.56 trillion
dollars for the value in 1980 of the rep1acernt cost of the business capitai
for new capital goods. This loss is described by equation (12) and equals 10.5
cents of capital (rrasured at replacement cost).
Thus no equipment, but a substantial fraction of structures, could gain by
being brought under ACRS. In the case of structures, a 1are fraction of the
capital loss induced by AORS could be avoided in this way. However, the pres-
ence of transaction costs of unknown magnitude rkes it difficult to know how
mch of this turnover would take place. We may place upper and lower bounds on
the size of the capital loss induced by the introduction of ACRS. With no turn—Table 2








Gain f.€om Rsale (P—q —R)
1 .054 .84T —.062
2 .135 .T96 —.o
3 .161 .153 —.OS1
4 .215 .118 —.io
5 .220 .690 —.071
6 .255 .667 —.o8
7 .246 .645 —.052
. . .
>10 .3b6 .521 —.o6—23—
stock,we obtain a range of 233 to 292 billion dollars as the effective wealth
tax inô.ced bytheintrothction of ACR$.
This result is only a rough calculation, and ignores the actual heterogen-
eity of the capital stock. Moreover,in the presence ofadjustment costs (see
below), the prices of all capital goods, including old ones, y rise with a
surgein der.nd induced byan investment incentive such as ACRS. This would act
tooffset part of the capital loss induced by the more generous tax treatxint of
new capital versus old. However, the losses just calculated still are rieanin—
ful in that they represent the drop in value of existing capital relative to the
valuesuch capital would have had, had the additional tax benefits of AC}S
applied to all capital.IV. TheSimulation Model and Its Parameters
The Auerbach—Kotljkoff sinulation model calculates the equilibrium growth
path of an econonr consisting of government, household, and production sectors.
The life cycle version of the model used in this study incorporates expensing of
new capital and costs of adjusting the level of the capital stock. In addition
to expensing, the government's policy instruments include capital income, con-
sumption, and wage taxes, the level of government consumption, and the choice of
a deficit policy.
The household sector consists of fifty—five overlapping generations, with
the total population growing at a constant rate. The fifty—five period life
span corresponds roughly to the life span of an adult. In each generation there
is a single, representative individual, and generations differ only with respect
to their opportunity sets. The production sector is characterized by fir rx—
imizing the present value of their profits by choosing both annual levels of
labor input and annual rates of investment.
Each household chooses life cycle labor supply and consumption by maxi—
mizin an interteiorally separable CES utility function (Auerbach, Kotlikoff,
and Skinner, l983) with a constant static elasticity of substitution between
consuraption and leisure at a point in tiiae and a constant interteiaporal elasti-
city of substitution between consumption at different points in time, leisure at
different points in time, and consuntion and leisure at different points in
time. The simulation presented below incorporates a one percent population
growth rate, a static elasticity of substitution of .8,andan interteniporal
elasticity of substitution of .25. These elasticities are suggested by recent
eirical studies of saving and labor supply.5
The production function used here is Cobb—Douglas, ith capital's income
share equal to twenty—five percent. The costs associated with investment are
—— -. — — — c.., £IU.S ' j.v can 4 0. Id Q a U LI LUCI ¼) S LI U A. LII., SC .1. U. U 41. C U LILI 4 .5.415—25—
quadratic as in the sirrafiation model of Kotlikoff, Learner, and Sachs (1981),
that is, the mr4nal cost of a new dollar of capital, including Installation
costs is:
(16) p(') =1+bC)
where I is investment and K is existing capital. The term b is the adjustment
cost coefficient. Larger values of b imply greater marginal costs of new capi-
tal goods for a given rate of investment.
The government choice of policy instruments is constrained by an inter—
temporal budget that holds over infinite tine.Thisbudget constraint requires
thatthe present value of government capital income, wage, and consumption tax
receipts be sufficient to payforthe present value of government consumption,
the present value of expensing deductions, and the value of existinb government
netdebt. The assumption that government debt (surplus) per capita cannot grow
infinitely large is sufficient to generate this constraint on the tine path of
government policies.
The constraint implies that government policies are necessarily inter-
dependent. A corollary is that certain deficit policies are not feasible. For
example, the government cannot permanently change its expensing policy and per-
manently meet the consequent change in its receipts by simply altering its issue
of debt. Such a policy would lead, over the long term, to either an infinite
debt or an infinite surplus per capita. The probability that the change in the
present value of tax receipts exactly equals the present value loss in revenues
from changes in expensing is zero. hence, to meet its budget constraints, the
government rmist eventually raise or lower a tax instrument or its level of con-
sumption in response to chanes in its expensing policy. The next section indi-
cates that for certain expensing policies the government need never raise any
tax rate and, indeed, must lower tax rates at some point in the future to bring—26—
government finances into long term balance. Investment incentives that require
no increases in current or future tax rates or reductions in current or future
government consumption are described here as self—financing.—27—
V. Investnnt versus Savings Incentives —IllustrativeSimulations
No single comparison of policies that do and don't discriminate against old
capital can meaningfully summarize all differences in economic growth paths
associated with investment versus savings incentives; the government's inter—
temporal budget constraint requires adjusting other government policies in
responseto these incentives in order to maintain a present value equality bet-
ween its receipts and expenditures (including interest and principal repayments
ondebt). The differences in capital formation arising from the implementation
of investment rather than savings incentives depends on the choice and timingof
theseother necessary OiCyadjustments.
Contrast,for example, two policies that begin with a proportional incoire
tax, one introducing permanent, 100 percent expensing, and the other permanently
rernovjnthe tax on capital income. The reductionor possible increase in reve-
nues from either of these policies could be financed by immediate or future
changes in the tax rate on labor income, current or future changes in government
consumption, or some combination of changes in these and/or other available
instruments. Given the range of possible concommitant adjustments in other
policies, statennts such as "investment incentives stiulate more capital for-
mation than savingsincentives"are meaningless. Comparisons of investment and
savingsincentives for explicitly specified policies of adjusting to the asso-
ciated revenue changes do, however, permit meaningful conditional comparisons of
investrentand savings incentives.
Thefirst similation we present involves of a permanent re!aoval of capital
incoiretaxes, withdebt policyused to maintain the wagetaxrate at thirty per-
cent for five years, and wage taxes adjusted thereafter to maintain a constant—25—
levelof debtpercapita. This simulation also assumes that there are no
adjustment costs involved in changing the capital stock.
The initial steady state is characterized by a capital—output ratio of 3.04
and a gross interest rate of 8.22 percent. The specified policy leadstoa
7.35percentreduction in capital per capita, and a greater reduction in labor
supply, withtheresulting drop of 8.90 percent in output per capita. The wage
tax rises to !47.8percentin the long run. The path of per capita capital
stocks over the transition period is shownbythe solid linein Figure 1.
The solid line in Figure 2 showsthewelfare effects on transition cohorts
of this deficit financed elimination of capital income taxation; the horizontal
axis indexes the cohort's year of birth (relative to the first transition
year, i), and the vertical axis measures the amountby which the cohort's labor
endowment vector would need to be increased (or decreased) under the old regime
to allow the achievement of the same utility level asthat attained under the
newregime. The long run welfare loss is 8.7percent,but, in the short run,
older generations gain relative to their ex ante prospects. This pattern of
gainsand losses is similar to that occurring under a policy (examined in
Auerbachet a].., 19d3) ofswitching immediately to wage taxation withoutrunning
deficits, represented by the dotted line in Figure 2. However,both the short
rungains and the long run losses are larger when debt policy is used, because
ofthe further shifting of tax liabilities onto future generations. The impact
on capital forrr.tion isanotherdifference associated with the use ofdeficits
tofinance savings incentives; the dotted line in Figure 1 shows the path of
capital per capita arising from a balanced budget switch from incoue to wage
taxation. Rather than falling, the capital stock rises in the long run.
The next policy we consider is a move to immediate expensing of all invest-
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finance the loss in revenue. After five years, income taxes rise to mintain a
constant level of debt per capita. The capital stock and welfare transitions
are shown by the solid lines in Figures 3 an 4,withcorresponding paths under
immediate balanced—budget expensinb (as discussed in Auerbach et al., 1953),
shown by the dotted lines. The effects of the implicit wealth tax on the origi-
nal owners of capital is evident in both diagrams. The utility of older tran—
sition cohorts is decreased, and capital accumulation enhanced by the reduction
in their consumption.
The five year delay in allowing tax rates to rise again leads to a lower
long—run capital stock, but to a imich smaller degree. The reason for this is
that the deficits created by the policy during its first five years are imich
snaller. The long—run level of debt to capital is just 2.13 percent, compared
to 13.8 percent in the case of the first siinjlation. In fact, the long runrate
of incon taxation is 28.9 percent ——lowerthan the value that obtained before
the creation ofthedebt.
Thusfar in our sixrn.ilations, we have igiored the possibility that the short
run supply curve for capital goods may slope upward. That is, attempts to
increase quickly the amount of capital in response to an increased investment or
savingsincentive mayresult in a higher price of capital goods relative to con—
suinptiongoods. If this is true, then our results may overstate the capital
loss borne by holders of existing capital arising from an investment incentive
such as expensing.
Setting the adjustment parameter b (see (16) )equalto the empirically
plausible value of 5 (see Blanchard, 1951) for the siinilation of a transition to
expensingwith a five year deficit policy yields the following results. First,
thedrop in capital stock values by the full value of expensing is not immed-
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capitalgoods. The price drops by 22.5 percent in the first year of the transi-
tion rather than 30 percent. Second, the welfare lOSSofolder transition
cohorts is smaller and the long—mn gain also sn.ller (5.92 percent) than in the
sizm1ation without adjustment costs (6.29 percent). The welfare paths are corn—
paredin Fiire 5.Finally, thecapital stock grows by a smaller amount,
because notall of the demand induced by the investment incentives translates




THE IMPACTOF ADJUSTMENT COSTS
(SWITCHTO EXPENSING U}DER FIVE YEAR DEFICIT POLICY)
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Various strategies have been offered to reduce short run deficits asso-
ciated with tax cut policies. In this section, we present three simulations
that bear on the feasibility and advisability of avoidin short run deficits
while increasing the incentive to invest.
Atypical solution to short—run revenue losses isa phase—in of investment
incentives.Thischaracterized the Economic Recovery Tax Act of1981, which
calledfor the acceleration of depreciation allowances to increase in1981and
again in 1985 and 1986.6 The problemwith policies of this kind is that they
induce capital losses gradually over the phase—in period. The awareness of
potential investors of such future losses discouras investment in the short
run, defeating the entire purpose of the legislation. This can be seen in the
nextsimulation, which measuresthe effects of a five—year phase—in of expensing
withoutdeficits, with the expensing fraction rising linearly from .2 in the
firsttransition year to 1 in the fifth. Deficits are avoided by the adjustrcent
of the income tax.
Though investment eventually expands under this policy, the short run
impactis todiscourage investment. Figure 6 compares per capital capital
stocks for the first twenty years of this policy with those arising from an
imidiate balanced budget switch to full expensing. Theshort—rundisincentive
toinvest is also reflected b. the drop in interest rates. The initial steady
state interest rate is 8.22 percent. Under the investment phase—in policy, the
grossinterest rate (the yield that bonds would have to offer to provide the
same after tax return as capital, inclusive of' capitalgains and losses) is
negativeuntil the phase—in is completed, and then jumps to over12 percent.
















































0 5 10 15 20—35.-
Amore successful wayofavoiding deficits recognizes that investment
incentives can often be achieved by raising rather than lowering capital income
taxes. Recall that under a policy of full expensing that is effectively
restrictedto new capital the effective tax rate on capital income is zero.
While the return on savin is not taxed at the margin, the increase in the sta-
tutory capital income tax rate increases the implicit wealth tax on existing
capital. This reduces the consumption of wealth holders, permitting an expan-
sion ofnational saving and investment. In addition, the extra revenue from the
capital income tax allows the government to lower other taxes. Starting from an
initialsteady state with full expensing and a 30 percent income tax, raising
the capital income tax rate to 50 percent allows an immediate drop in the wage
tax rate to 26.5percent(falling eventually to 21.6 percent) and an eventual
increase in capital per person of 34.6percent.
Finally,investment incentives may be self—financing in the long run,
requiringno current or future increase in statutory tax rates to achieve a rre
capital intensive long run steady state with no debt. As an exale, from an
initial steady state with no expensing consider a policy of moving directly to
50 percent fractional expensing, with the income tax held constant at 30 percent
for twenty years; while there are short run deficits, the expansion of the
income tax base over time raises revenue sufficient to retire this debt.
Indeed, in the twentieth year the debt—capital ratio is —.36 percent. This sur-
plus permits a slight decrease in the income tax thereafter (to avoid an
expanding surplus), to 29.2 percent in the twenty—first year and 29.0 percent in
the long run. The per capita capital stock increases by 25.9 percent in the
long run.
Part of the explanation of this result is that, while taxes on capital
income and, eventually, labor income decline, existing capital owners face—39—
increasedimplicit wealth taxation under this same policy. Their welfare
declines,thus distinguishing this policy from those offered by the "free lunch"
theorists. A second aspect of this policy is that the econorr has shifted to a
more efficient tax structure, substituting lump sumtaxeson initial wealth
holders for distortionary income taxes on current and future generations. These
efficiency gains also provide economic resources to "cut taxes and raise
revenues."
While this policy of fractional expensing eventually leads to surpluses and
tax rate reductions, a policy of full expensing (discussed at the beginning of
-tneprevious section) does not have this feature, indicating the presence of
nonlinearities in the functions determining the ecouon's behavior. One such
nonlinearity is associated with the well—known result that the excess burden of
a tax rises at a rate proportional to the square of the tax rate itself. Thus,
the initial reduction in the effective tax rate on saving induced by a policy of
50 percent expensing does proportionally more to reduce the distortion of
savings behavior than does a policy of nxving froia 50 percent to full expensing._140...
VII. Su.mmary
The key difference between savings and investment incentives in closed eco—
nomies is the applicability of these incentives to old as well as new capital.
Investment incentives discriminate against old capital; savings incentives do
not. This discrimination reduces the market value of old capital and, there-
fore, the economic resources of owners of the existing capital stock. The
reductions in the resources and welfare of initial wealth holders under invest-
ment policies are essential]- identical to those arising from a one time wealth
tax.
In life cycle economies, the remaining resources of the elderly are held
primarilyin form of non—human asopposed to human wealth.The effective wealth
tax generated byinvestmentincentives falls, therefore, most heavily on the
elderly. For a given time path of goverrunent consumption and given character-
istics oftastesand technolor, extra taxes onthe currentlyelderly imply off-
setting receipts of resources by young and future generations. In life cycle
economies, the elderly have a greater marginal propensity to consume than the
young because of their shorter life expectancies; future generations obviously
have zero current marginal propensities to consume. Hence, the intergenera-
tional redistribution of resources away from the elderly, arising from investment
incentives, leads to a major reduction in the econo's current consumption.
The reduction in the consumption of the elderly effectively finances the
"crowding in" of investment.
For certain ranges of investment policy instruments, the long term tax
revenues arising from the increase in capital intensity are sufficient to
finance the short run loss in revenue from these incentives. Hence, there is a
range of investment incentives that are self—financing. In general, deficits—41—
associated with investment incentives are less injurious to capital forization
thanthose associated with incentives.
In contrast to investment incentives, savings incentives such as permanent
reductions in the taxation of profits at the corporate level typically redis-
tribute towards rather than away from the elderly. The impetus to current con—
suxnption arising from this redistribution ——the incone effect ——isoffset to
some extent by the greater marginal incentive to save ——thesubstitution effect
of ahigher after tax rate of return. The net impact of savings incentives on
capital formationdepends on the use of deficits to finance these incentives.
As demonstrated here, deficit—financed reductions in capital income tax rates
can sharply lower national capital formation.
The policy most conducive to capital accuimlation involves sirmaltaneousJy
increasing investment incentives and capital incone tax rates. Such a policy
caüd eliminate deficits, raise the after tax return to narinal saving, and
produce income and substitution effects that both operate in the direction of
stiilatingcapital formation.—42—
Footnotes
1.For the government to maintain long term budget balance, it needs to
choose a path of overnzaent consumption that equals Ki +FK —
t—l)
present value.
2.After the effective date of the l92 Act, this result would be altered by
the application of a fifty percent basis adQustraent for new credits taken.
3. U.S. Department of Conurce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Fixed
Non—ResidentialBusiness and Residential Capital in the U.S.,1925—1975,"
PB253 725, 1976.
4.FlowofFunds, "Balance Sheets for the U.S. Econontr, 1945—19d0," Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C., l98].
5.Auerbach;Kotlikoff and Skinner (l93) survei this literature.
6.The l95 and 19ö6 changes have been repealed by the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 19b2._14 3...
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